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RSAC 2021
May 18, 2021, Online, USA
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Election Security: Lessons from the Front Lines
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About the talk

Bryson Bort, Founder and CEO, SCYTHE Cynthia Kaiser, Section Chief, FBI Lester Godsey, Chief Information Security Officer, Maricopa County Geoff Hale, Senior Cybersecurity Advisor, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Public trust in election infrastructure and results rests on a transparent approach by government at the national and local level. Hear directly on the actions taken prior to and the lessons from the 2020 election from the 4th largest county in the US, DHS and FBI. Where does this effort lead us to for 2022 and beyond?

About speakers

Bryson Bort
CEO and Founder at SCYTHE
Cynthia Kaiser
Section Chief at FBI
Lester Godsey
Chief Information Security Officer at Maricopa County
Geoff Hale
Director of the Election Security Initiative at DHS/CISA

Bryson Bort is the Founder and CEO of SCYTHE, Founder of GRIMM, and Co-Founder of the ICS Village, a nonprofit advancing education and awareness of security for industrial control systems. He led an elite research and development (R&D) division that directly contributed towards national security priorities and interest. Bort received his BS incomputer science from the United States Military Academy at West Point. He holds a master’s degree in telecommunications management from the University of Maryland and a master’s in business administration from the University of Florida in addition to completing graduate studies in electrical engineering and computer science.

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Cynthia Kaiser is a Section Chief with the FBI Cyber Division. She has covered technology and counterintelligence issues for over 15 years for the FBI and has served as an FBI lead for cyberthreats to elections since 2017.

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Lester Godsey is the Chief Information Security Officer for Maricopa County, leading all cybersecurity and data privacy efforts for the organization. Prior to Maricopa County, Lester was the CISO/CPO for the City of Mesa, AZ.

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Mr. Hale is the Director of the Election Security Initiative, a Department of Homeland Security-led interagency body charged with coordinating federal support to the election infrastructure community. Mr. Hale is a certified information systems manager and experienced cyber operations planner and has supported the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications since 2010. Mr. Hale is a graduate of the University of Virginia and earned his Master’s Degree in Systems Engineering from George Washington University.

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Hello, Siri, and welcome to a panel on Election security elections belongs to the people. It's their decision. If they decide to turn their back on the fire and burn their but I'm unable just have to sit on the blisters that quote by Abraham Lincoln elections are critical in a free and fair Society. How to trust an election infrastructure? Begins with understanding what the government has done with transparency and how we as Citizens in the community. Have a role play as well. My name is Bryson bored. I'll be today as moderator. My full-time job. I'm the founder and

CEO a startup called site. Will start with introductions for our distinguished analyst, beginning with Lester. Hello everybody. My name is Pastor God. See I'm the Chief Information security and privacy officer for Maricopa County. I'm sure most of you have heard us in the news. But for those of you not familiar with Maricopa County population, where the fourth largest county in the United States and needless to say, 2020 was quite a year. Cynthia. Expressing my inner city of Kaiser. I'm a section chief with the FBI cyber division at where I've been in analytic lead for

elections Redskins 2017. I'm really excited to be here today to talk about what we saw in 2020 and how that might affect some of our expectations for 2022 and Beyond. Anja. Express in happy to be here. My name is Jeff Hill. I lead the election security initiative that the cybersecurity and infrastructure Security Agency. I've been a part of this election security Mission since 2016 and seen it a lot of growth. All right, let's go. We're going to start with you. What did you see in 2020? Well, probably a

better way of putting it is what we didn't see which was very little from a technical perspective. We saw a variety of different tactics. By one thing I want to remind audience is that 2020 had three different election Cycles in it. So the presidential preferential election the primary and then the general election in. So over the course of actual calendar year. We saw quite the variety of tax. And so we saw, you were typical Port scanning. We, we saw a DDOS attacks. We saw a number of different activities from a social media perspective,

and really everything in between. But I would definitely say that from a 2020 perspective. One of our biggest challenges and what came to the Forefront was challenges around misinformation and disinformation from a social media perspective. That really was A game-changer, from our perspective here in Maricopa County for sure. Cynthia. So, I hope those women able to go and read the ODI record in the report, from the Department of Justice and Department of Homeland

Security and do a lot of detail about what we observed during the 2020 election cycle, but for me, I hope there's not three takeaways people take from those reports. It one is the unprecedented way. That Federal local state, election officials, private sector, and the public all work together to be able to understand what was going on across all the election system. And that really gave us confidence in the conclusions that we came to. In those reports. It allowed us to you don't have a

transparent feeling about what had occurred and understand the information that was going into all of those second is we have no evidence not through. Our collection, I born after themselves, not through our monitoring of voting system. Not through our audit, after-the-fact, not through any other means that you're in our other actors sought to manipulate election results. And then third, though, so we didn't see the adversaries going to do after The Ballot Box. We saw the try to influence our

minds with the name towards destabilizing society and they did that through variety of means, the actors made me from your Iran. And Russia were amplifying content. They already found on social media creating new content, going through intermediaries, trying to intimidate voters directly post-election trying to do with the election officials and exacerbate tensions further and I think really then it looking towards what we can learn from that. Then is Really how much the whole of society effort.

All of this is and that goes towards government officials who needs to be having a regular information, sharing with election officials and giving indicators of compromise and doing the public service announcement. That goes with the private sector, who are pointing folks to verify source of information and taking down content, that violates the terms of service or lagging, the different cyber campaign. All have to be better consumers of the media that

were taking any information or taking in and critically evaluate information. We're taking it and go out and speak goes to verify. So, you know, really looking at one of those three, takeaways from what we saw in 2020, you know, I come down to thinking through you, how much work we all? Are continuing to do and need to do in this day's today and make sure that we aren't. We aren't feeding into any adversary campaign. Yeah, specifically, the report you were mentioning was the foreign threats to the 2020 US federal election

published by the National Intelligence Council on the 10th of March, was alright, shortly after there was one published by the Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security. The talked with the impacts to infrastructure and provide a recommendation as well. What makes a great point about the 2020 election having for more security safeguards and capabilities in place than any election before. Have never, if we had the same level of information-sharing push down to State and local elections

officials are pushed to their private sector Partners never have, we had in this level of scrutiny on an election and and it's important to say that even though this was a model election. We had to ABC actors president and I report describes both Russia and the Ron being active on election. In the structure of being active in social media and information in any state that starts the new normal for a car in 2016 involved in 2020. We're going to have to be ready for it. Directions to come. So Lester, Jeff, just talked about how information-sharing is approved.

And as we spoken before this panel, there's been a bar shift from what we saw in 2016 and you couch. And you know what, we see. This is what we haven't seen your response. Do you feel like your level that the federal government was really providing you? The information that you needed? Short answer is absolutely. So Traditionally from my perspective years pass a used to feel like information-sharing was more or less. One way to be honest with you. And so I think it again, I started to see your shift

in general. Election is side with regards to the formation of C, says part of DHS. So we started seeing a more collaborative fashion and then on top of that, we've seen additional collaboration with our partners at the FBI, actually Secret Service as well, excetera, excetera 2020 elections. We just saw it. It was a night and day difference in terms of intelligence sharing sew-in in the case of Maricopa County. We basically created a specialized Play Books, specifically around it, the elections and a big portion of that Playbook, Not only was our

our tactical or technology-based response to things that we would see. But also the communication protocol. So in our instance, we day of election and actually leading up to it. We will utilize portions of our Playbook especially around social media monitoring. And then we were reporting what we were seeing internally within the organization and then passing that along to our Fusion Center here which then obviously disseminated that information to our federal Partners, but for example, Dave general election, we started at 5 a.m. Recording on an hourly

basis General activity that. We saw that also included social media, because one of the things that we discovered from an intelligent perspective is social media, Not only was a source of intelligence. Regards to cyber activity with some of those things that we observe might translate into Connecticut events as well protest. Things of that sort. And then just to get to the heart of your question, their rice him to just point. We actually saw day of evidence of one of these advanced persistent threat groups. And so

then I recycle that we communicate that accordingly until we were in contact with the FBI that day to validate what we had seen versus, what they had seen in other regions of the United States. So it was very Cooperative. He was excellent and honestly Church in communication, that's been the most collaborative effort I've ever been involved in. And Jeff. This speaks a lot to where we seen a strategic shift in seats over the past couple of years. I can you talk about more about that. Thanks, bro, isn't really one of the biggest impact. We were able to

have was by funding the establishment of the year for the election. Instructor Information Technician at this like a tailor need for the protection of election. In the structure, local election jurisdictions, really, that's where elections are running administered. It's easier to talk about elections is all 50 states, but we really think of a reason changes of each of those jurisdictions recognize the relationship at that level and start the tailor, or Services of how we can provide value to those election

officials who focused on cyber security services. At, this is known for cyber hygiene tration testing. Response plan. And how do you, how do I identify if you need to tell where you getting assistance? If you're a local jurisdiction, we go through, scenario-based training exercises. That's where a lot of the value. I think Susan was able to provide. I just having those relationships being arm-in-arm with FBI and local FBI offices as we presented a unified federal government to our state and local Partners. Will Cynthia luster

also gave your organization to shout out there if you could expand on that a little bit more so I didn't Federal government's FBI's. If it were pushing information out to election officials at the same time at the same time. I think we were getting a lot of information from election officials and that made everybody safer. So it'll really think the majority information. State officials saw something. It looks suspicious contact, the FBI contacted Elisa and then we were able to get that out further and say, you

know, hear something that you need to watch out. But you in terms of you, how FBI was really involved in that. I think that the partnership assistant and how do they work with us? It was just so close and so easy relationship because we have to declare the ignition and what we're trying to accomplish, and we were on the calls with us has an election officials every other week so I can do that. I'm having various other meetings when we needed to do or when freseros and I think all that collaboration, be all of us better. We understood from the FBI

and they understood, you know, when we were using certain language are getting this information that needs this information that's actionable. I highlight one particular policy that the FBI spearheaded an early 2020 which is the where we met and dated, any time. There was a local election incident that that she still watching official was also notified and additional policy mirrors that. And so anytime there was these local election in a potential insurgents were going to the Tri-State, Electric official. So the Secretary of State or

equivalents and talking about what was happening and I think the bat really gauge everybody confidence. That's after the election that those two state, election officials knew what we do and could make decisions and make your certifications for English. Okay. Now that's a tough question for the panel weave. We talked a lot about 4 and threaten influence. We briefly touched that fact, that the recent domestic. So the hot-button topic of disinformation which received both foreign and domestic Lee and we still see the continued effects of domestication formation

with dots on the election, which is a large challenge for us. I'm so I'm not going to put anyone on the spot yet. Who wants to be first to to jump into domestic versus foreign this information and what can be done at different levels like you muster with his hand raised, Western Europe. So maybe I can kick this off and then our federal Partners can kind of add some flavor to it from a national perspective, social media information and misinformation was a game-changer for us. And I would go so far as to say from a government perspective, moving forward, any cyber

security or information security teams, they should be adding this to their portfolio services because this is not going to go away just because the election's over. Frankly. I think we are in a new new era if you will, in terms of additional threats and risks, as well as source of information for all of us, but back to the 2020 elections. We saw quite a bit of this activity and it wasn't necessarily just your, your, your normal. If you will are popular consumer, social media platforms. We saw plenty of that to give me an example of my statement

earlier about how Social media threat intelligence, might translate into a kinetic event. We actually picked up Intelligence on social media about people using that platform to coordinate, a caravan to follow our election staff. When do you were moving from one location to another? And So that obviously presented itself. That's a risk depending on what would occur along those lines. Obviously. We, we saw a lot of evidence with regards to coordination and communication about protests, which obviously everybody's welcome to protesting as long as it's done in a fashion, but

another example, that was really interesting and this goes back to the intelligence sharing with our federal Partners is the fusion centers throughout the United States. Did an excellent job of communicating with one another and the locals receiving that information. So, we heard from a fusion Center. We just had made an observation about Third party vendor who was popular in the government's case in terms of government services and collaboration if you will. And so we will you receive some intelligence with regards to that. We determine. That

was a platform that we were familiar with. And so upon further investigation. We, we saw evidence of utilization of box to automatically, register thousands upon thousands of new new users on this platform. And so we reached out to our federal partners and that vendors and again, you know, it's not the local job to to articulate where the thread originated from. We just reported it. But I think that was a good example of how you be a likelihood that we were able to circumvent a situation where

that platform was being used to spread this information. So, I think it's often helpful to to reframe. This is a bit of butt ass applying to man challenge. We have in the US government's, most robust capabilities to degrade, disinformation actors who are coming from foreign sources, the intelligence community, and take you to take action against the practice. But at some level that the game of whack-a-mole you're always chasing and reacting to, to disinformation spreaders. And and disinformation here being the spreading of

impulse information with intent, to do harm to the coast of misinformation wear it, again. Formation without the malicious intent. The ability to Target that boost thread actor interventions is it is a great tool in the in the tool set up but it can't be the only thing we have until that addresses. The supply of disinformation in many ways. But on the other side of the equation, the demand side of the equation Americans are also searching for information. So how do you make sure that they Information, environment has access to all of the, the

appropriate trusted sources of information, election officials in this sector for accurate. Daytime information about how the election is administered. What their security practices and Protocols are a lot of attention on that resilient side. That's supply-side, that. Or let them inside. Where, how do you prevent the information environment from being overly distorted? We're not trying to stop anyone from being wrong on the Internet or just trying to make sure their information environment is not so broken

right before the election where we were trying to get out information to the American Republic where you might see this. And are, you might see these kind of false claims and What it really means and you can vote anyways, and it really trying to get verified information. Both our agencies out sooner than they could make some of those choices. I think one interesting, anecdote, in a shifting gears for this next thinking about domestic or foreign disinformation is what the Iranians did during the election. Because what we saw them do before the election is

directly try to intimidate voters and masquerading as a domestic actor. What we doing after the election is, threatening the lives on websites of election, officials in the US government officials, and you know that to it wasn't labeled a product of a more domestic sources and you know, I know one element that you're both as an FBI try to do is get out public service announcements to talk about like hit this activity, is Iran backs if you Tweet from these handles, you're

spreading Iranian disinformation. And so it really being able to bridge the gap. Of helping Folks at Dewey information-sharing to help understand where information is coming from. In addition to some of the activities that Jeff was talking about at the exercise. I think is really the way forward in in trying to look at some distress. That's okay. I'm going to come right back at you with a difficult question. So just talked about wackamole and you represent one of the agencies that actually does something outside of here to solve

some of that. How can we, how can we do more? How do we? I mean this has made me late isn't a question of deterrence. But what, what else can we do, besides of this? And I can let you know, just talk through, you know, maybe a little more of the recommendations that we put out in some of the reports about Shoring up our election system's overall, your item that out. Then we're not done, we have to continue what we're doing and get better at what we're doing it, make a difference. But I guess what I worry about is a 2020 to 2024, where

adversaries believe, they can conduct these activities with impunity, that that there's no consequences. Activities that they're seeking to do and you know, I think that's why director Ray announce the FBI director gray. And now I'm assuming it's really essentially about getting some of these adversaries to sing change. Their cost-benefit analysis, would have been doing activities in the first place and get to the point of saying it. It's just not worth it. Yeah, that's a long day and we're not going to do one thing and have that be deleted. But I know there's ways in

which you do everyday that we're working towards that. And I think, as we expand activities, really can make a difference, you know, one is what we were starting to get Network's. Do a adopted best practices their security and In addition, know, if we need to get into Yale and deterrence, he will take some of that is detecting TT. Attributing actors. Like we did with Russia and Iran right before the election. Like it was saying that if you do this, we're going to publicly out what you've

done and activities are conducting as well as working with Partners on infrastructure. Takedowns or any other operations to try to see if there's really a lot and squirrels under all of that. But it kind of put it under the banner of how do we increase the risk of any and how do we increase the Jeff dad. I think it's the 8th, a great Challenge from There's always going to be a segment of the population that is going to reject the message from the messenger that particularly when the messenger is the federal government, but the best that we can do, in many instances is try to make sure that the

information just environment is not in great Disorder. So that those populations that are undecided about about, whether this piece of information, this artifact that this information is true or not. What do they have? The opportunity to find better sources. So, we're working with a lot of election officials on, how are they tracking in their information? However, they are maintaining their basically standards of procedures so that they can be as transparent, how they tracking it. How are they testing against it? Then director Chris, kreps at, his three pieces,

were trying to a different letter here. But, but at least three actions, how are you transparent about all of the security practices that you have to the point that you can engender? You may not be speaking to absolutely everyone, but hopefully you're reaching the people who haven't decided to be complete projectors of here. And I Buster outing from the local level. Yeah. Solutely. And we certainly support. And obviously there are certain activities that local governments can't do. And so we have to rely upon our federal partners

that says especially when it comes to being a deterrent self locals. Can't go Rogue, of course, but we have a responsibility as well. And so when the things that we've tried to do a trick of the county is share amongst our other local partners with regards to our approach. Our tactics things that we've learned. For example, another example from a Caesar perspective is not only have we partnered with them from a cyber perspective to take a look at what are what are security posture is. But else on the physical of kinetic

side, we've actually had security advisers from Cecil do site visits to Val. Elections perspective, Consolidated, all that information into specialized Play Books along those lines that address a number of different scenarios from a cyber perspective as well as communication. And even before the actual elections wrapped up. We shared that information freely obviously sanitize with our other other counties in the United States, and other organizations at Maricopa County, participate stand. And so, we as local

governments need to do, collectively a better job and have a more formal stringent processing place, especially when it comes to intelligence sharing that we follow and execute. When the critical things in terms of what Cynthia was talking about for future elections, is everybody needs a practices. So it's one thing to have it documented have your Play books. But if the first time you're looking at, your playbook is day of election, then that's not the Right tack to take. So, I'm happy to say at least with my county that we had multiple tabletop exercises

involving a variety of different groups, including our our, our quarter, for the county and then those play bugs and that process and communication flow. Again. It's Cynthia mention. We share that information. We shared, I play books with Caesar with the FBI with the Secretary of State here in Arizona. And so I would encourage and in preparation for future election Cycles. We need to share more information at the local local and we need to practice what were preaching as well too. So that way we're loyal machine when it comes to the next election cycle.

Yes, as soon as something, Cynthia said earlier about the fact that it's continuous while the election security itself is punctuated by specific events of this election. And make sure that we've effectively capture the will of the voter for at the different levels is continuous. And so in the context of what we're already doing to plan for the next one. Can you share a little bit more about that as well as what we might expect from a different adversarial elements? So in the case of Maricopa County, we take a very

iterative approach. And so that's what we did in 2020. So, after each election cycle, we did a hot washed. We are identified. What, What observations we made during that election cycle. We factored that into weather is updates to our play bugs Edition. We brought on new technology, specifics, but we brought an additional capabilities to do social media monitoring, for example, and so, in our case, what we continue to do is we continue to refine our our election Play books. Are General incident response Play books and then also our

information-gathering and visibility. So whether it's improving our dashboard capabilities in our sins so that we can more quickly pivot automate, some activities. So we're spending less time doing basic intelligence gathering and having that process out of And then continuing to partner with our Fusion Center and then communicate with regard to how the communication flow was going. Are we responding fast enough? Are we able if we can better identify with those ioc's are that are needed excetera excetera than so much so much better with regards to the

efficiency, and efficacy on how we interact with our state and federal partners. Cynthia. So yeah, I think that the lesson learned for all of us was just how much we all need each other at you, during all these election cycles. And that's really, we're looking towards the future. We really need to do. We need to keep the partnership strong and we keep talking to each other. We can't look around. And thank, you know, June 2022. I guess we should start talking to you. Yeah, we have to really remain

committed to working with each other, to the agency Wing that we've had with electrical with the private sector, the conversation with the American public about, what is a foreign campaign, but we are seeing coming down the pike and Greeley just solidify the work that we've done to get us the point that far. Jeff. I completely agree with Cynthia and Lester on this. There are some areas where we can continue to mature as his is doing a lot of work with the election. Bender community on supply chain

supply chain. Be another thing of 2020 in addition to the battery supply chain for which basically much of the United States has the election be on that working to again, support local election officials in in the credits that possible. Other other Milestones that are important to the voluntary voting system. Guidelines updated. So by 2024 there maybe new systems that have additional security particular around auditability and software Independence, that are going to be big accomplishments in the ability to secure a lot of work to do. But. But there's progress in about every area.

Suggested Dimensions, the supply chain. And here we are speaking at the largest IT security conference in the world. So the question to the group and we'll start with. Lester is what would you ask attendees in their capacity as Information Security Professionals as well as that they are. All respected citizens. So yeah, that's a great question in. So, I guess what, one of the things I would ask of the vendor Community as a whole, is an acknowledgement on. What the ramifications are of their technology and

their solution understanding? The shift in technology and such that we we have a greater and greater dependency on supply chain down the road. Whether that's from an operational perspective, or from the information security perspective is. So, having the knowledge of where those dependencies are, is critical in terms of delivering, a free and fair election. And that other thing to keep in mind to is there doesn't actually have to be an event that can cause a disruption to the

election. It just has to have the appearance of an event if that makes sense. Meaning, you know, look there's a saying, perception is reality. Right? And so, we all collectively saw in 2020 that the vast majority of what was communicated, weather, social, media, or even traditional media, in some instances, just frankly wasn't true, but it went itself towards giving the sense that there was maybe some impropriety and again to Cynthia and Jeff is mentioned. There's no evidence of that whatsoever across the board. Yet. They were the county with Sharpie gate, for example,

that wasn't a thing and so vendors just need to take into consideration. The sensitivity around their technology is Lisa relates to the elections and how just a perception self Could Be A disruption. Cynthia. So, you know what? I look back on 2020 and I just did. So intensely proud, the men and women across the FBI who works on this local and state election officials, the private sector, and everyone coming together and working towards. This is just everyone in this is really gave it their all to get us to the point that we're at today. And

so I got two things of folks attending day, you know one is continue to know the FBI and her sister when you see something suspicious so that we can investigate it, help you and help everyone else in the station and make everyone safer that if you ever considered joining the fight and I think Now's the Time is growing, we are adding lots of different positions. Adjust your agents and analyst with data, analyst data scientist, computer scientist. You don't have to

be there by 7 formation. Really? I think folks have that interest in either working with or working for our organization, be bigger than yourself, really work for imposing or some consequences for election cycles, and you can really beat that. And Jeff. Yeah, I couldn't agree with you more and come work for us to do. This is been the coolest job. I've had the experience and ensure that if you're not going to do a tour with the with the federal government, go talk to

your election officials. Took two years to begin to understand how elections are actually run. Don't assume. You know, it talk to them. Come pick some Services until you understand where the position that they're in. And then from there, you can figure out how to help they get a lot of solicitation. What they want to do is a distance. What would you change in the system, Leicester. I probably would change change of system in such a way that there was a greater sense of

confidence. And Transparency with regard to the whole election. And what would you have talked about? Sounds pretty darn close to that. So if we can hit that stage, all we want to do is be able to provide this service to our constituents where they are 100% confident that their loads going to be counted. And it's not going to be tampered with Cynthia. So I'm going to ask for she wishes, you don't want as everything's patched and she can go, is that I American. You understand elections is done now.

Just like to know Jeff is talking about just like all of us, come to learn it, you know, the more and more because it once you learn about it, you really are able to help us in collusion coming out. Folks involved. Add chapstick at home. Kirsten VZ auditability, we did a great job across the across the country. I think about 93% of the evidence by which election be convincing, but the second is consistent funding or elections so that they're not left in the same position.

Just trying to scrape in order to perform the the maintenance for election for the necessary. All right. Thank you to all of our distinguished analyst for joining us today.

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